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Abstract
The dominant approach to studying the eﬀects of IMF programs has emphasized moral
hazard, but we ﬁnd that adverse selection has more impressive eﬀects. We propose a novel
strategic selection model to study the growth eﬀects of IMF programs, which allows for the
possibility of adverse selection. We ﬁnd that adverse selection occurs: the countries that are
most interested in participating in IMF programs are the least likely to have favorable growth
outcomes. Controlling for this selection eﬀect, we ﬁnd that countries beneﬁt from IMF programs
on average in terms of higher growth rates, but that some countries beneﬁt from participation,
while others are harmed. Moral hazard predicts that long-term users of Fund resources beneﬁt
least from participating in programs, while adverse selection predicts the opposite. Contrary to
previous ﬁndings, we ﬁnd that IMF programs have more successful growth performance among
long-term users than among short-term users.
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Countries that face a sharp deterioration of their current accounts or a sudden stop of interna-
tional ﬁnancing frequently turn to the IMF for balance of payments support. In these circumstances,
governments hope to avoid a costly collapse of the ﬁnancial system or of domestic consumption, in
the expectation that the combination of IMF ﬁnancial support and economic reforms will improve
economic performance. Empirical support for this expectation is mixed, however, and the literature
on the eﬀects of IMF lending is on the whole quite pessimistic. Furthermore, a number of poor
countries have been involved in IMF programs for many years, and the emerging consensus both
inside and outside the Fund is that these cases are even less favorable for economic growth. These
observations pose a puzzle. Why do countries seek to participate in IMF programs, if their results
are generally negative?
The lack of consistent econometric support for the proposition that IMF lending is beneﬁcial
is particularly striking in studies of short-run eﬀects, which constitute a substantial portion of the
literature. It is understandable that IMF lending, like development assistance in general, might
be ineﬀective at promoting medium- or long-term growth, either because it proposes inappropriate
policy adjustments, or because those policy measures reduce growth for several years before they
begin to bear fruit, or because painful measures are indiﬀerently implemented. However, the point
of IMF lending is to help in the very short run. It provides an emergency stream of ﬁnancing
that is intended to prevent a severe economic downturn caused by a shortage of ﬁscal liquidity or
foreign reserves. In the absence of such ﬁnancing, presumably, the crisis occurs; and banking crises,
sovereign defaults and currency crises are generally followed by a sharp contraction of economic
activity. Meanwhile, IMF conditionality has not had time to have much eﬀect, either positive or
negative, in the same year in which a program is announced, so any short-run eﬀect is attributable
to lending rather than policy reforms. We revisit the data, focusing again on short-term eﬀects,
and suggest that the econometric analysis is at fault, rather than governments’ expectations.
Scholars acknowledged the problem of selection bias in evaluating the eﬀects of IMF programs
long before they succeeded in adequately addressing it (Goldstein and Montiel, 1986). In recent
studies of IMF program eﬀects it has become standard practice to use some kind of selection cor-
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rection, whether a Heckman-type parametric selection model, an instrumental variables approach,
or matching (Steinwand and Stone, 2008). Which approach is chosen is consequential, because a
selection correction is only as good as the speciﬁcation of the selection equation.1 We introduce
an estimator for the selection stage that incorporates strategic interaction. That is, we model the
government’s and IMF’s choices with a strategic game, and derive the likelihood function from
their expected utilities. This estimator is an improvement over previous approaches in several
respects. Unlike single-equation estimators, it allows for the possibility that some variables have
countervailing eﬀects; for example, making countries more eager to apply for programs but making
the IMF less eager to approve them. In addition, our estimator provides a more convincing solu-
tion than previous approaches to the problem of partial observability: we observe a program when
both agents assent, but when we do not observe a program, we do not know which agent withheld
consent. Models with partial observability are notoriously fragile, but our strategic model is more
stable, because we use the structure of the game to improve identiﬁcation. Finally, the strategic
model allows for strategic interaction. The government might be deterred from applying for an
IMF program, for example, because it believes that a program is unlikely to be approved.2
The results of our analysis lead to three substantive conclusions. First, in contrast to prominent
recent studies, we ﬁnd that the average treatment eﬀect is positive, and the majority of IMF
programs have beneﬁcial short-term eﬀects on economic output. Although it is conventional wisdom
that IMF programs lead to short-term contraction of GDP, we ﬁnd that the average program is
less contractionary than the counterfactual without IMF support. Second, we ﬁnd great diversity
among the treatment eﬀects experienced by particular countries, and show that governments that
are most eager to participate in IMF programs generally experience the least beneﬁcial eﬀects.
Third, the eﬀects of IMF programs are more positive, rather than less so, in countries that have
1Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) made an important advance by pointing out that initiating an IMF program
requires the consent of two agents, a government and the IMF. This implies that two selection equations are needed
to model the process of program approval. Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) and Vreeland (2003) use a bivariate probit
model with partial observability to account for these separate decisions, and ﬁnd that IMF program participation is
harmful to growth when correcting for selection eﬀects. We introduce an alternative approach, which also incorporates
partial observability, but unlike Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) and Vreeland (2003), our model incorporates strategic
interaction.
2Strategic interaction, in eﬀect, introduces a series of interaction terms into the government decision equation
between variables that aﬀect government utilities and variables that aﬀect IMF utilities.
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extended participation in IMF programs. These results are robust to using the data used in recent
studies (Vreeland 2003) and to using a new data set that we gathered, which has broader coverage
from 1970-2008.
The key implication of our analysis is that the IMF faces a problem of adverse selection (Akerlof,
1970). Countries that apply to participate in IMF programs have unobservable attributes that are
correlated with their future economic performance, which might be related to the policy preferences
of the government, to social instability, or to other political factors that we have not considered.
For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to applicant governments as being either of a “good” or a
“bad” type, where good governments are expected to promote growth and bad governments are
unlikely to do so. The IMF cannot separate the worthy from the unworthy applicants, and any
observable attribute that it might use to distinguish among them is correlated with the objective
need for support. Meanwhile, the best candidates for successful growth are countries that choose
not to apply. As a result, the pool of countries available to participate in IMF programs is skewed
towards the type that is unlikely to successfully implement reforms and return to growth. Just as
the best used cars are rarely oﬀered for sale, the countries with the best growth prospects rarely
approach the Fund for assistance. Those that do ask for support tend to be lemons.
Our results indicate that the poor performance of IMF programs is due to adverse selection, and
that the failure to ﬁnd evidence that these programs promote growth in the quantitative literature
is due to the failure to adequately model this strategic selection process. We show that the countries
that are most strongly interested in participating in IMF programs are in fact the least likely to
grow. When we control for this selection eﬀect, we ﬁnd that IMF programs have a signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect on growth. Furthermore, contrary to concerns about recidivism and long-term use of
Fund resources, we ﬁnd that the selection eﬀects are mitigated and the growth eﬀects are stronger
for countries that are already participating in IMF programs. Consistent with our theory of adverse
selection into IMF programs, we ﬁnd that the growth eﬀects are strongest for the countries that
have participated several years. This suggests that the IMF gradually discovers the borrower’s type
by observing its compliance with conditionality and adjusts its programs in ways that compensate
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for the problems posed by weak governance.
1 Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
The International Monetary Fund was not originally intended to promote economic growth, to
engage in long-term lending, or to oversee economic reform programs. Its original purpose was
to safeguard the system of ﬁxed exchange rates foreseen under the Bretton Woods agreements by
pooling resources to provide short-term balance of payments support to deﬁcit countries. As the
Fund gradually expanded its sphere of activities, however – conditionality was formally introduced
in 1952, medium-term lending was established in 1974, and lending at concessional interest rates
for poor countries was introduced in 1986 – it has increasingly been judged according to its success
or failure at promoting economic growth. Critics argue that IMF programs in fact retard growth,
either by promoting inappropriate economic policies or by creating perverse incentives. A growing
concern is that long-term use of IMF resources may be particularly harmful because it creates
patterns of dependency. The literature on IMF programs is replete with discouraging ﬁndings.
In a review of 24 studies of the eﬀect of IMF programs on growth published through 2000, Stone
(2002) reports that only one found statistically signiﬁcant results that supported the view that IMF
programs promote growth; two found signiﬁcant results that indicated that IMF programs retard
growth; the rest were inconclusive. In a review of twelve studies published between 2000 and 2008,
Steinwand and Stone (2008) ﬁnd two statistically signiﬁcant and positive results, seven signiﬁcant
negative results, and three inconclusive results. These studies use data sets with varying coverage
and employ a wide range of methodological approaches, and the results are generally discouraging;
however, the inconsistencies suggest that the question is far from resolved.
Reasons oﬀered for these disheartening ﬁndings diﬀer. A substantial body of scholarly opinion
holds that IMF programs are ineﬀective at promoting economic recovery and laying the groundwork
for long-term growth because the IMF promotes an inappropriate mix of policies. As Ngaire Woods
bluntly puts it, “There is no incontrovertible evidence that the IMF and the World Bank know what
is good for their borrowing countries” (Woods, 2006). Joseph Stiglitz argues that IMF conditionality
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follows a uniform pattern of macroeconomic contraction, privatization and deregulation that is
inappropriate for most developing countries, and that bad economic policies are responsible for
poor growth outcomes (Stiglitz, 2002). The claim that IMF conditionality follows a cookie-cutter
pattern that varies little from country to country has been rejected by empirical studies, which
ﬁnd that it varies widely and responds to local circumstances (Ivanova et al., 2003; Gould, 2006;
Stone, 2008). Nevertheless, the possibility remains that conditionality is harmful to growth. An
alternative explanation for poor growth results is that conditionality is frequently not implemented.
A study sponsored by the IMF found that 70 percent of IMF programs are interrupted at some
point because of non-implementation (Ivanova et al., 2003). A more recent study shows that 93
percent of countries that participated in IMF programs over a decade suﬀered program interruptions
(Stone (2011), 182). If implementation rates are low, it can be diﬃcult to determine whether
poor outcomes are due to implementing harmful conditionality or not implementing beneﬁcial
conditionality (Vreeland, 2006). In studies of short-term program eﬀects, however, the question is
largely irrelevant, because conditionality is rarely fully implemented in the same year as a program
announcement, and in any case has not had time to exercise whatever inﬂuence it will ultimately
have on growth rates. Short-term eﬀects of IMF programs must be due to the eﬀects of ﬁnancial
support or the reactions of capital markets.
The most prominent explanation for the negative eﬀects of IMF programs is the problem of
moral hazard. Moral hazard is an incentive problem created by insurance: if agents do not pay for
the consequences of their actions because they are insured, they have weak incentives to mitigate
risk. Concerns about moral hazard have been at the forefront of policy briefs that have called for
reining in the Fund and restricting its activities to short-term balance of payments lending rather
than long-term development and structural adjustment lending (Hills, Peterson and Goldstein,
1999; Meltzer, 2000). If countries can rely upon the IMF as a second source of ﬁnancial reserves
and capital market participants come to believe that certain countries are “too big to fail” – as
was often claimed for Russia and Argentina until they did fail – the incentives for governments
to pursue sensible ﬁscal policies are weakened. Capital ﬂows to risky countries in spite of their
weak fundamentals because a rescue is expected if the investment climate turns stormy. This, in
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turn, becomes a self-fulﬁlling prophecy. Indeed, the debates within the Fund about how to respond
to crises always balance a concern for containing ﬁnancial instability with a concern about not
promoting moral hazard. During the Mexican crisis in 1995 and the Asian Crisis in 1997, for
example, IMF Staﬀ and Executive Directors debated whether an overly aggressive response would
promote moral hazard (Blustein, 2001; Copelovitch, 2010).
One version of this argument focuses on Fund support for governments that were committed
to defending ﬁxed exchange rates during the 1990s (Goldstein, 1998). Governments often face
political temptations to defend currency pegs long after they might have otherwise abandoned
them, because this allows them to put oﬀ policy adjustment (Cooper, 1971; Frankel, 2005; Leblang,
2005). If they defend ﬁxed parities while simultaneously following inﬂationary policies, the results
are overvalued exchange rates, declining competitiveness, slow growth and, eventually, a currency
crisis. A supportive stance by the IMF can exacerbate the temptations to put oﬀ adjustment. A
second concern is that IMF activism in promoting debt rescheduling during sovereign debt crises
may encourage the unwise borrowing and lending practices that create the problem in the ﬁrst
place. The IMF became deeply involved in rescheduling debt during the 1980s debt crisis and the
Asian Crisis of 1997, and every major debt rescheduling operation by the Paris and London Clubs is
supported by an IMF program (Lipson, 1985; Aggarwal, 1996; Blustein, 2001; Copelovitch, 2010).
There is a ﬁne line to be walked between stabilizing international ﬁnancial markets suﬃciently to
promote the free ﬂow of capital and promoting unwise international lending by lowering its risks.
A third concern is that IMF ﬁnancing may reduce the incentives for governments to solve
long-term structural problems that contribute to slow growth and underdevelopment. As the IMF
Independent Evaluation Oﬃce evaluation of prolonged use of Fund resources concludes, “[T]he
drawbacks associated with prolonged use are suﬃciently serious to warrant a greater eﬀort to
reduce its extent” (Independent Evaluation Oﬃce, 2002). Bird, Hussain and Joyce (2004) argue that
repeat users of IMF resources constitute an underclass of the international system that has become
a clientele dependent on the IMF. “Recidivism,” as they label this phenomenon, is associated with
extreme poverty, weak external accounts and high levels of foreign debt. A number of studies
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have found that countries that have used IMF programs in the past are more likely to use them
again, suggesting that recidivism is a real phenomenon (Atoian and Conway, 2006; Jensen, 2004;
Pop-Eleches, 2009; Sturm, Berger and de Haan, 2005).3
This paper proposes an alternative to the prevailing view. In our view, IMF programs have a
wide range of observed eﬀects, some of which promote growth, and some of which impair growth.
Many of the unfavorable outcomes are caused by perverse incentives attributable to moral haz-
ard, but the inﬂuence of these problems has been overstated because the literature has not fully
appreciated the depth of the adverse selection problem the IMF faces. The participants in IMF
programs diﬀer systematically from non-participants in ways that are not easy to observe but that
have signiﬁcant implications for their future economic performance.
Adverse selection occurs when one partner to a transaction has private information that aﬀects
the other partner’s payoﬀ if the transaction occurs. In Akerlof’s classic example, used-car sellers
have better information about the value of their wares than used-car buyers. The price that buyers
are willing to pay is based on their priors about this private information, so selling is unattractive
to the owners of high-quality cars and attractive to the owners of low-quality cars. As a result, the
distribution of quality in the cars actually oﬀered for sale is skewed downwards, which depresses
the market price. In equilibrium, therefore, mutually beneﬁcial transactions fail to be made.
We argue that a similar problem arises in IMF programs. The potential sellers in this example
are the countries that oﬀer to implement economic reforms in return for IMF support, and the
buyer is the IMF, which has diﬃculty separating the credible reformers from the non-credible ones.
Borrowing governments have at least three information advantages over the IMF.4 First, there
3Moser and Sturm (2011, p. 317) ﬁnd a diﬀerent eﬀect for the post-Cold War period. In a pooled analysis,
they ﬁnd a robust relationship between prior participation and continuing participation; however, in a conditional
ﬁxed-eﬀects analysis, they ﬁnd that prior participation reduces the probability of participating. This indicates that
results claiming an eﬀect of recidivism were instead capturing the underlying propensity to participate.
4The assumption of our econometric model is that there are unobservable variables that aﬀect both government
decisions to participate in IMF programs and subsequent growth performance under those programs. It is not
necessary to this argument that these variables be unobservable to the IMF. The IMF might, for example, have good
intelligence that the government plans to renege on its commitments, but be willing to oﬀer support nevertheless.
What is necessary to our argument is only that these variables are not observable to us as analysts, so that their
eﬀects can only be estimated, rather than controlled for. However, we argue that some of these variables are in fact
unobservable to the IMF, and this accounts for the pattern of adverse selection that we identify below.
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are economic data that are known to the government but not to the IMF. As the peso crisis was
unfolding in 1994, for example, the Mexican government delayed reporting the level of central bank
reserves and the ﬁscal deﬁcit to the IMF. During the 1996 presidential election, the Central Bank of
Russia violated IMF conditions by secretly using its reserves, which had been placed in anonymous
oﬀ-shore accounts, to support the market for government bonds. When the IMF Mission arrived
in Korea in the midst of the 1997 crisis, it did not have accurate information about the level of
central bank liabilities, the volume of non-performing loans in the commercial banking sector, or
the foreign liabilities of Korean banks. These turned out to be the key variables that intensiﬁed
the crisis, because Korean banks had borrowed heavily and lent heavily in dollars, and the central
bank had pledged most of its reserves to cover their debts. Second, there are political judgments
that the government can make better than an outside agency. For example, how much austerity
can the Greek government sustain before it loses its margin of support in parliament? How much
wage restraint can the unions be convinced to exert before they refuse to cooperate? Third, there
are questions about the government’s own intentions. The IMF could not know how far the de la
Ru´a government was willing to go in 2001 to defend its ﬁxed exchange rate of one Argentine peso
to one US dollar. The Fund could only guess what Boris Yeltsin planned to do after winning the
1996 election. Each set of factors can aﬀect both the government’s interest in participating in an
IMF program and the likely eﬀects of that program.
Returning to the used-car analogy, the price is the degree of conditionality imposed in the
adjustment program. The IMF seeks to support successful economic reform programs and avoid
failures, and from the IMF perspective, the risk of program failure is a function of the government’s
type – its level of commitment to economic reform – and of the degree of conditionality. Multiple
binding policy conditions that specify detailed procedures rather than general targets increase the
likelihood of identifying and preventing policy slippage, but make the program more intrusive and
politically risky from the perspective of the borrower. A symptom of adverse selection arises when
the IMF imposes a relatively high price of participation because it is uncertain of the type of its
borrowers. If all of the Fund’s borrowers were committed reformers, it could oﬀer less constraining
programs, which all of the countries would be willing to accept. Because many potential borrowers
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are not committed to reform, however, the IMF oﬀers conditionality packages that are intrusive
and constraining. This interpretation is consistent with the marked increase in conditionality that
occurred in the 1980s – the average number of performance criteria climbed from 7 between 1974 and
1982 to 12 between 1983 and 1990 – as lending expanded in Africa and countries in the grip of the
Latin American debt crisis drew heavily on IMF resources (Gould, 2006). Some of the committed
types are unwilling to participate when conditionality is intrusive, so the distribution of borrowers
is skewed towards the type of government that is not committed to implementing reform. Three
factors exacerbate the adverse selection problem: enforcement problems, non-transparent ﬁnancial
data, and capital market expectations.
If IMF programs were enforceable contracts, it might be possible for the IMF to screen potential
borrowers by oﬀering schedules of conditionality that ensured that only committed reformers would
participate. However, the IMF’s only instrument to ensure compliance is to withhold installments of
ﬁnancing, or tranches, and it ﬁnds it diﬃcult in practice even to do that for long. Consequently, the
borrowers that ﬁnd IMF conditionality most costly are the ones that actually intend to implement
the promised reforms, and the ones that have no such intention ﬁnd it relatively costless to agree
to the IMF’s terms. Rather than resolving the IMF’s information problem, strategic screening
exacerbates it and strengthens the tendency of the worst candidates to step forward.
Second, it might be possible to screen out the less committed if it were the case that committed
reformers had greater need for IMF support than faux reformers. The opposite is the case, however.
Among the key variables that are diﬃcult for the IMF to observe are the level of usable international
reserves (which potential borrowers often disguise through elaborate accounting tricks) and the
vulnerability of the domestic banking sector. Poor values on these variables make borrowers highly
vulnerable to international ﬁnancial shocks and therefore eager to participate in IMF programs to
shore up their weak external accounts. Governments that underreport their vulnerability, however,
are unlikely to be committed reformers, so those countries that are more vulnerable than they seem
are likely to be poor candidates for IMF programs.
Third, if committed reformers stood to gain more from participating in IMF programs than
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other countries, they might tend to apply for programs at higher rates. One such argument that
the Fund routinely makes is that IMF programs represent a “seal of approval” for a government’s
policies, which catalyze private capital ﬂows. By implication, the IMF has superior information
that allows it to separate worthy from unworthy borrowers and convey this information to capital
markets. However, to the extent that participating in IMF programs imposes a stigma on the
recipient government, which is seen as surrendering a portion of national sovereignty to foreign
powers, participation might be a signal of weakness: only truly desperate governments need apply.
The recent quantitative literature yields a mixed verdict, with several studies ﬁnding that IMF
lending does not catalyze private capital ﬂows (Bird and Rowlands, 2002; Eichengreen, Gupta
and Mody, 2006; Jensen, 2004), and others ﬁnding that it does under certain conditions (Mody
and Saravia, 2006; Bauer, Cruz and Graham, 2012). It appears that in some cases, rather than
representing a “seal of approval,” an IMF program signals to markets that a crisis is looming. To
the extent that IMF lending sends a negative signal, the best-managed countries should avoid IMF
programs.
The above argument leads to three testable hypotheses. First, a selection model that allows
for the possibility of strategic adverse selection should ﬁnd that countries that are most interested
in participating in IMF programs are the worst candidates for growth. Second, if adverse selec-
tion rather than moral hazard accounts for the negative correlation between participation in IMF
programs and growth, a selection model that controls for adverse selection should show that IMF
programs improve economic performance. This should particularly be the case in the short term;
indeed, if IMF programs do not improve the odds of weathering ﬁnancial crises on average, at least
in the short term, it is hard to explain why countries vountarily participate in them. Finally, a
further implication of the adverse selection view is that – contrary to the critique of recidivism
– prolonged use of IMF resources should be more beneﬁcial than short-term use, because over a
longer time horizon the IMF is able to screen countries and determine which are willing to commit
to policy reform, gradually mitigating the problem of asymmetric information that lies at the heart
of the IMF’s performance problem.
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2 Method
It has long been recognized that the fundamental empirical problem in assessing the eﬀects of IMF
programs is selection, although initial contributions were agnostic as to whether selection made
the IMF’s eﬀects appear more or less beneﬁcial than they really were (Goldstein and Montiel,
1986). IMF programs are not applied at random, so the sample of program participants diﬀers in
systematic ways from the sample of non-participants. This means that any comparison of the two
groups may be subject to selection bias (Heckman, 1979). The eﬀects of the bias can be mitigated by
using parametric selection-correction or non-parametric matching techniques, and the choice should
depend on theoretical expectations about whether selection occurs on observable or unobservable
factors. A parametric approach is preferable if we have strong priors about the selection mechanism,
particularly if selection is primarily on unobservable factors such as the government’s commitment
to reform, as argued here. Since our model provides us with expectations about the functional form
of the strategic interaction between the IMF and borrowing countries, exploiting this information
improves the eﬃciency of our estimates.
In particular, our theoretical argument is that there is selection on unobservables, which con-
tradicts the necessary assumption for matching to provide consistent estimates.5 Furthermore,
matching can be appropriate if the analyst is only interested in uncovering a treatment eﬀect, but
it does not allow the analyst to investigate the mechanism by which selection aﬀects outcomes.
Our method, in contrast, allows us to directly estimate the eﬀects of adverse selection. Getting a
consistent estimate of the eﬀects of IMF programs net of selection is interesting, but IMF programs
do not exist without selection problems, so it is really just an estimate of a counterfactual. The
eﬀects of selection are what we are theoretically and substantively most interested in, and matching
cannot shed any light on those.
Our statistical model is comprised of two parts: a selection step that determines selection of
observations into our sample, which takes into account the strategic interaction between a govern-
5Matching techniques rely on the assumption of strong ignorability, which means that any factors that distinguish
the treatment and non-treatment groups after matching have no eﬀect on the probability of receiving the treatment.
This cannot be the case if there is adverse selection.
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ment and the IMF; and the outcome equation on countries’ annual growth rates that takes into
account non-random selection into the sample by making use of appropriate selection corrections
derived from the ﬁrst step. Below, we ﬁrst describe the outcome equation, and then develop and
discuss the selection model we use.
2.1 Outcome Equation: Annual Growth Rate of GDP
Given data on growth rate (Y), IMF program status (P), and a set of factors that we believe to
aﬀect growth rates (X), the ﬁrst model speciﬁcation that comes to mind is:
Yi = Xiβ + δPi + i (1)
where  is the error term capturing unobserved factors aﬀecting growth rates of countries, normally
distributed with mean zero and variance σ2 . This speciﬁcation makes several important assump-
tions: ﬁrst, it assumes that program status aﬀects growth only by changing the intercept, and the
eﬀects of the other regressors are unchanged. Second, the assignment of IMF programs to countries
is assumed to be random, or not correlated with the dependent variable. If these assumptions
are satisﬁed, this model can be estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The sec-
ond assumption is likely to be violated, however, since IMF programs are not sought and signed
randomly, and unobservable factors determining selection into an IMF program are likely to be
correlated with unobservable factors aﬀecting growth levels. If such a correlation exists, estimating
equation 1 with OLS will result in biased estimates of the eﬀect of IMF programs on growth. To
deal with this selection problem, we model growth with a “switching regression” model described
in Maddala (1983):
Y1i = X1iβ1 + 1i iﬀ P = 1 (2)
Y2i = X2iβ2 + 2i iﬀ P = 0 (3)
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where Y1i represents the growth rate for countries that are under a program in a given year, and
Y2i represents growth in countries not under a program. To estimate the eﬀect of IMF programs on
growth, we need to ask the counterfactual question, “what would the growth rate of a participating
country have been, had that country not participated in an IMF program?”6 We consider two
alternative speciﬁcations of this counterfactual that are discussed in Maddala (1983) and Cameron
and Trivedi (2005): In the ﬁrst, the gross program beneﬁt for participant i can be calculated as
GB = Y1i − E(Y2i|P = 1) (4)
where we calculate the diﬀerence between the observed growth rate of a country under a program
and the predicted counterfactual growth rate that would have resulted had that country not been
under a program. An alternative measure, the estimated expected beneﬁt from an IMF program
for participant i is
EB = E(Y1i|P = 1)− E(Y2i|P = 1) (5)
where we calculate the predicted diﬀerence between the growth rates of the country when under
and, counterfactually, not under a program.
2.2 Sample Selection: Strategic Probit with Partial Observability
If selection into programs is not random and is correlated with the error term of the growth
equation as we argue, running two OLS regressions to estimate equations 2 and 3 will not result in
accurate estimates due to selection bias. To calculate GB and EB accurately, we need to calculate
appropriate corrections for expectations E(1i|P = 1) and E(2i|P = 0) that take into account
non-random and strategic sample selection.
We use a parametric technique because we want to test for the presence of a particular type of
selection eﬀect: strategic adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970). The problem from the IMF’s perspective
6This is the well-known treatment eﬀects problem that has been utilized widely in the econometrics literature,
and discussed in Maddala (1983), Greene (2003), and Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
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is that some of the countries that it would like to support do not apply, so it never has the
opportunity to oﬀer them support. This suggests a particular strategic form to estimate, which is
illustrated in Figure 1, below. The potential borrower moves ﬁrst, deciding whether to apply for
IMF support or not, and applies if the expected utility of applying (and possibly being rejected)
exceeds the utility of non-participation. The IMF then decides whether to approve or reject the
applicant based on observable factors, conditional on its interim expectation about the set of
countries that apply.7
[Figure 1 about here.]
Based on this strategic form that determines program participation, we develop a statistical
strategic probit model with partial observability to model selection into our sample of IMF pro-
grams. This selection model incorporates the strategic interaction hypothesized by our theory into
the likelihood function to be estimated, which should improve the eﬃciency of our results and re-
move any bias due to strategic misspeciﬁcation (Signorino, 1999; Signorino and Yilmaz, 2003). We
argue that a candidate government faces uncertainty about the IMF’s response when deciding to
seek an agreement with the IMF. Based on observable indicators of the IMF’s choice, the govern-
ment calculates the IMF’s probability of signing an agreement, and makes a decision strategically
based on its expectations about what the IMF will do. It is assumed that both the government and
the IMF have utilities associated with the outcomes resulting from their choices, and the following
two latent equations together determine selection into IMF programs:
G∗ = psignUG(Prog) + (1− psign)UG(Decl)− UG(NoApp) + εG (6)
I∗ = UI(Prog)− UI(Decl) + εI (7)
where εG and εI are normally distributed random variables,
8 and psign is the IMF’s probability of
7In practice, rejection takes the form of insisting on the adoption of performance criteria or prior actions that the
borrower is unwilling to fulﬁll, but in that case the analyst observes only non-participation.
8We use the agent error speciﬁcation of Signorino’s (1999) strategic probit. To make estimated coeﬃcients com-
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agreeing to a program with the government, estimated using equation 7. A government seeks a
program with the IMF if and only if G∗ ≥ 0. Likewise, the IMF prefers entering into an agreement
with a government if and only if I∗ ≥ 0. The government’s and the IMF’s utilities are modeled
with explanatory variables. As analysts, we only observe a program when both the government
and the IMF are willing to sign one. In the absence of a program, we cannot know with certainty
whether the government did not seek a program, or the IMF did not want to enter into a program
with an interested government. Thus, to model the overall probability of no program (P = 0), we
need to employ a partial observability model that accounts for both possibilities. In other words,
Pr(P = 1) = Pr(G∗ > 0, I∗ > 0)
Pr(P = 0) = 1− Pr(G∗ > 0, I∗ > 0).
We can now calculate our selection corrections to be used in the growth equation. This results in
the following expectation for countries that are under an IMF program:
E(Y1|P = 1) = X1β1 + E(|G∗ > 0, I∗ > 0)
= X1β1 + ρGσλG + ρIσλI (8)
where λG =
φ(Gˆ∗)
Φ(Gˆ∗)
and λI =
φ(Iˆ∗)
Φ(Iˆ∗)
are the selection corrections for the government and the IMF
interest in a program, respectively. For countries that are not under an IMF program, if we assume
that the country did not choose to apply for a program, the expected growth rate is:
E(Y2|P = 0) = X2β2 + E(|G∗ ≤ 0)
= X2β2 + ρGσλ∼G (9)
parable to the bivariate probit speciﬁcation that has been used in the literature (Vreeland, 2003), one needs to either
assume that the stochastic components associated with IMF and Government’s expected utilities have standard errors
equal to 1/
√
2, or be aware that the estimated coeﬃcients represent an estimate for the actual coeﬃcients scaled by√
2σ. This is akin to the problem of unidentiﬁed error variance in a probit model, where scholars either assume that
σ = 1 or estimate βs scaled by σs.
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where λ∼G =
−φ(Gˆ∗)
1−Φ(Gˆ∗) is the selection correction for the lack of government interest. If, instead,
the government wanted to participate in a program but was unable to reach an agreement with the
IMF,
E(Y2|P = 0) = X2β2 + E(|{G∗ > 0, I∗ ≤ 0})
= X2β2 + ρGσλG + ρIσλ∼I (10)
where λ∼I =
−φ(Iˆ∗)
1−Φ(Iˆ∗) is the appropriate selection correction for this possibility.
Because of partial observability, when there is no program (P = 0), we cannot know whether
the government did not seek one or the IMF was not interested in entering into a program with
the government. Thus, we use the estimated probabilities for each observation from our selection
model to decide whether to use equation 9 or 10 to calculate the selection corrections for the growth
eﬀects of participating in an IMF program.9
As Vreeland (2003) argues, the processes that determine program participation may depend on
whether a country was already under a program in the previous year. We therefore separate the
decisions to enter a new program spell and to continue to participate in a program, and estimate
the transitions from one state to the other as a dynamic Markov process. We also correct for
the potential eﬀect of program duration for countries that are under a program, and non-program
duration for countries that consider entering a new program.
3 Results and Discussion
The dataset covers all IMF members from 1970 to 2008, of which 104 countries are used for
estimation. Descriptions of the variables used in our empirical analysis and their summary statistics
9This approach is superior, for example, to assuming that none of the countries that are not participating in
programs applied for support, or that all applied but were rejected. Assigning countries to the most likely case takes
advantage of the information we have about country choices from the strategic selection model, and allows us to
estimate the diﬀerences between these two theoretically distinct groups of countries, which would otherwise bias our
results.
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are presented in Tables 6 and 7. In addition, we performed the same analyses using the data from
Vreeland’s (2003) study on the eﬀects of IMF programs on economic growth, which cover the years
1970-1990.10 More details about those results are available in the online appendix.
Table 1 presents estimation results from four models of program participation. All four are
strategic probit MLE models, so the government’s decision to apply for a program is modeled as
a function of its expectation about the probability that the IMF will agree to such a program.
The ﬁrst two models utilize the data from Vreeland (2003) and span the years 1970-1990, and the
second two use our extended data and span the years 1970-2008. The ﬁrst and fourth columns
present the results of analyses in which countries that are and are not currently under programs
are pooled, which assumes that their governments’ utilities and IMF utilities are not aﬀected by
their current program status. The remaining columns present the results of analyses that are
performed separately for countries not under programs (“enter”) and countries that are currently
under programs (“remain”). The results indicate that the determinants of participation diﬀer
depending on prior program participation, so our preferred speciﬁcations estimate those decisions
separately. On the other hand, our results are broadly consistent using the Vreeland (2003) data
and our extended data. Except where otherwise indicated, the following discussion relies on the
extended data and the separate estimation for entering and remaining under IMF programs.
[Table 1 about here.]
The results show that governments are more eager to enter a new IMF program when they
have low levels of central bank reserves, high ﬁscal deﬁcits and daunting debt service burdens.
In addition, low levels of investment appear to make governments marginally more interested in
applying for IMF programs. The 1970-90 data suggest that recent elections have the same eﬀect,
but this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant in the extended data. Furthermore, both sets of results ﬁnd that
the IMF is more willing to support countries with large balance of payments deﬁcits in absolute
terms – that is, imbalances that might be systemically disruptive. The earlier data suggest that the
10The Vreeland (2003) data and the extended data begin in 1951, but the estimation sample begins in 1970 because
missing data cause the earlier decades to be eliminated by listwise deletion.
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IMF may be less willing to extend new loans when its resources are stretched thin by many other
borrowers, but this result is only marginally signiﬁcant in the extended data. The results from
the early data also indicated that the IMF was more willing to approve programs for democratic
countries, but this eﬀect disappears in the extended data. The broad similarity of the results is
reassuring.
To illustrate the substantive implications of our selection equation, in Figure 2 we graph the
eﬀects of variables that capture vulnerability to ﬁnancial crises on governments’ decisions to apply
for IMF support: central bank reserves, ﬁscal balances (surplus/deﬁcit) as a percentage of GDP,
debt service as a percentage of GDP, and the balance of payments in billions of U.S. dollars.
Each variable is normalized by its standard deviation to make the magnitudes comparable, and all
other variables are held at their means. As central bank reserves increase, the probability that a
government applies for a program steadily declines from about 0.5 at two standard deviations below
the mean to 0.22 at two standard deviations above. Budget balance has a less dramatic eﬀect in the
range shown in the ﬁgure, but the data are highly dispersed, so very large deﬁcits sharply increase
the probability of applying for a program. As debt service ratios rise from two standard deviations
below the mean to two standard deviations above, the probability of applying for an IMF program
rises from about 0.15 to about 0.58. Because crisis variables tend to move in tandem – deﬁcits,
debt service ratios, balance of payments crises and dwindling reserves are linked through direct
eﬀects and market expectations – the total eﬀect of ﬁnancial crises largely determines government
choices to apply for support.
[Figure 2 about here.]
The eﬀect of the balance of payments on government choices is indirect; it does not appear in
our government application equation. We assume, in fact, that the government is not concerned
with the absolute size of its balance of payments, but worries instead about variables that are
normalized by GDP and of more immediate policy concern. However, the beneﬁt of estimating
a strategic selection model is that we can identify the way in which a government’s decision to
apply for a program depends upon its expectations about whether the IMF will approve one. The
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IMF’s decision is strongly aﬀected by the applicant country’s balance of payments, especially when
the applicant is an important player in the international economy. Consequently, as the balance
of payments deteriorates, countries are more likely to be approved. Indeed, countries that are
not running payments deﬁcits are highly unlikely to be granted an IMF program. We ﬁnd that
on average countries prefer not to apply rather than to apply and be rejected. As a result, the
probability of applying decreases as the balance of payments improves.
Having analyzed the determinants of program participation, we are now in a position to analyze
program eﬀects. Table 2 presents the results of our growth regressions. Under each coeﬃcient
value, p-values are reported in parentheses. The table includes three models, each estimated with
country ﬁxed eﬀects. The second model introduces a lagged dependent variable, and the third
introduces year ﬁxed eﬀects in addition to country ﬁxed eﬀects. The results are consistent: the
selection correction for the probability of Government participation is associated with negative
growth outcomes, while the correction for IMF participation is associated with positive outcomes.
The IMF evidently prefers to oﬀer programs to countries that are likely to perform well, but the
governments that are most interested in participating are those that are likely to perform poorly.
[Table 2 about here.]
Table 2 shows that all of the models reported estimate that the average treatment eﬀect in-
creased economic performance, and the average estimated beneﬁt ranges from 1.36 percent of GDP
in the baseline model to 3.46 percent of GDP in the model with year ﬁxed eﬀects. All three models
estimate that the majority of participating countries enjoyed a positive beneﬁt in terms of output,
both according to the expected and gross estimated eﬀect criteria. In the model with year ﬁxed
eﬀects, that proportion rises to approximately three-quarters of participating countries.
Table 3 cross-tabulates the sign of the estimated beneﬁt of an IMF program with the sign of
the growth rate that program countries achieved. Of the 341 cases in which countries had positive
growth under IMF programs, we estimate a positive eﬀect of the program in 284 of cases. In the
172 cases where GDP declined under IMF programs, we estimate a negative eﬀect of the program in
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59 cases. In the remaining cases where GDP declined, our model estimates that the IMF program
nevertheless exercised a positive eﬀect. These results indicate that the negative simple correlation
(-.17) between participating in an IMF program and growth is caused by selection.
These ﬁndings are robust to a variety of regression speciﬁcations. Table 3 in the online appendix
available at this journal’s webpage includes nine additional speciﬁcations, including controls for life
expectancy, education and birth rates and alternative measurements of the dependent variable.
Table 4 in the appendix includes additional controls and explores the impact of missing data using
a comparison model with multiple imputation. Table 2 in the appendix reproduces our main
regression equations using the Vreeland (2003) data (1970-1990), and Table 8 presents eleven more
speciﬁcations using those data that include additional control variables and alternative measures
for the dependent variable. In all of the speciﬁcations considered, the average expected eﬀect and
average gross eﬀect of IMF programs remained positive, and a majority of program participants
are estimated to beneﬁt from IMF agreements.
[Table 3 about here.]
Figure 3 presents the predicted eﬀects of IMF program participation in the form of a his-
togram.11 There are a number of country years in which IMF programs are predicted to have
negative eﬀects, but the mass of the predictions lies in positive territory. There is signiﬁcant dis-
persion of eﬀects around the mean, which indicates that IMF programs have highly variable eﬀects.
Indeed, although the focus in the literature has been on establishing whether the mean eﬀect of IMF
programs is positive or negative, the variability of IMF program eﬀects suggests that explaining
the variation in these eﬀects is more important. We turn to this issue next.
[Figure 3 about here.]
We argued above that the poor overall performance of IMF programs is due to adverse selection:
countries that earnestly desire to participate in programs tend to be poor candidates for economic
11A similar histogram for the Vreeland (2003) data is presented as Figure 2 in the on-line appendix available at
this journal’s webpage.
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reform packages, and the countries that would be likely to succeed in implementing reform are least
inclined to participate. We are now in a position to assess this claim quantitatively by comparing
countries’ propensity to participate in IMF programs with their expected program beneﬁts. Figure
4 presents a quadratic regression ﬁt of the estimated growth beneﬁt on the estimated probability
that the government consents to participate in a program. The ﬁgure shows a negative relationship
between the government’s estimated probability of seeking a program and the estimated growth
beneﬁt that it receives from one. This supports our adverse selection hypothesis: the countries that
are most interested in participating in IMF programs are the least likely to have favorable growth
outcomes.
[Figure 4 about here.]
We can further unpack the selection eﬀect by investigating the indirect eﬀects on growth of
factors that make countries more likely to participate in IMF programs. Our model estimates that
variables that measure the severity of a ﬁnancial crisis increase the probability that a government
seeks IMF assistance. Since we estimate that an increased probability of IMF program participation
reduces the growth eﬀect of an IMF program, we can attribute some of the reduced growth eﬀect
to those variables. Figure 5 graphs central bank reserves, debt service as a percentage of GDP,
investment rates, and the budget balance (surplus/deﬁcit) as a percentage of GDP against the
estimated eﬀect of an IMF program. The predicted beneﬁts of IMF programs fall sharply as debt
ratios rise, and increase sharply as a function of reserves and investment rates. The results for
budget deﬁcits look rather ﬂat in the ﬁgure, but this is because the relevant range of this variable
extends widely on both sides of the area shown. In each case, variables associated with the severity
of ﬁnancial crises motivate countries to seek aid from the IMF, but countries with weaknesses of
these sorts are unlikely to perform well under IMF programs.
[Figure 5 about here.]
A few cases drawn from our data help to illustrate the logic of our model and spell out the
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indirect substantive eﬀects on growth exercised by variables that aﬀect participation in IMF pro-
grams. The Philippines participated in IMF programs in 1973 and in 1983, in both cases under
the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos, who declared martial law in 1972. However, the
Philippines acquired vulnerabilities between 1973 and 1983 that made it much less likely to perform
well under an IMF program, and only some of these were visible to the visiting IMF Mission. In
1973 we estimate a moderately low probability of 31 percent that the Philippines would choose
to participate in an IMF program, and we estimate a beneﬁt from program participation of 0.58
percent of GDP. The Philippines was in a position to perform well economically in 1973 because
it was not highly indebted, and it enjoyed rapid growth during the 1970s that was ﬁnanced by
substantial capital inﬂows. Under a series of IMF programs that lasted until 1982, the Philip-
pines achieved average growth rates of 5.2 percent per year. However, the Marcos regime was very
corrupt – Marcos himself is estimated to have embezzled some 15 billion dollars – and political
stability was undermined by repression and social unrest. Marcos declared an end to martial law
and prevailed in an election held in 1981, but only by engaging in overt fraud, and the major
opposition parties boycotted the election. In 1982 the Philippines was one of few Asian countries
that was swept up by contagion from the Mexican Peso crisis because it had run up substantial
dollar-denominated debt. The Philippines’ economic indicators had deteriorated by 1983, and we
estimate a probability of 71 percent that the Philippines would turn to the IMF for support. The
deﬁcit rose from 2.2 percent of GDP in 1973 to 4.9 percent of GDP in 1983, debt service increased
from 4.7 percent of GDP to 9.5 percent, the balance of payments moved from a surplus of 47 million
dollars to a deﬁcit of 69 million, and central bank reserves dropped from 4.3 months of imports to
1.8 months. Consequently, we estimate that a program initiated in 1983 would cost the Philippines
1.2 percentage points of GDP growth. Marcos was eager to obtain IMF ﬁnancing to shore up his
political fortunes, which were deteriorating as a result of his economic mismanagement. Only ﬁve
months after signing a program with the IMF, Marcos apparently ordered the assassination of the
opposition leader Benigno Aquino, which triggered a series of demonstrations that culminated in
his removal from power in a peaceful popular uprising in 1986. The Philippines entered a recession
in 1983, and GDP contracted by 8.6 percent in 1984 and by 4.7 percent in 1984. The case of
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the Philippines illustrates the logic of adverse selection: by the time its leader was eager for IMF
support, it was no longer a good candidate to beneﬁt from it.
Gambia participated in IMF programs in 1977 and 1982, and again this was a case in which
ﬁnancial variables deteriorated in the interim. Gambia was a stable constitutional democracy
in 1977 led by President Dawda Jawara, who won reelection ﬁve times. Gambia had relatively
strong ﬁnances in 1977 for a poor African country, and we estimate that the probability that the
government would choose to participate in a program was only 27 percent. This was a case with
a negative estimated program beneﬁt, where participation was estimated to cost Gambia half of
one percent of GDP. Gambia enjoyed an average growth rate of 4.9 percent per year under IMF
programs from 1977 to 1980. In 1981, however, a coup attempt destabilized the country and was
only put down after Senegal intervened. This appears to have been a truly exogenous event: the
coup took place in July 1981, when a leftist rebel, Kukoi Sanyang, took advantage of the fact
that Jawara was in London to attend the wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana. During
the crisis, the deﬁcit rose from 2.7 percent of GDP to 12.3 percent and reserves fell from 3.3
months of imports to approximately one week. As a result, the restored Jawara government was
desperate for IMF support, and we estimate a 68 percent chance of applying for a program in
1982. Under circumstances of high demand for support driven by political instability, the IMF
loan had an estimated eﬀect of reducing GDP by 2.6 percent. The Gambian economy continued to
grow at a 1.4 percent rate in 1982 but collapsed in 1983, suﬀering a decline of 14 percent of GDP.
Gambia formed a short-lived confederation with Senegal, but its political stability was shaken, and
another coup overthrew the democratic regime in 1994. Gambia was never a strong candidate for
IMF support, but its experience likewise illustrates the principle that a deterioration in economic
fundamentals makes a country less likely to perform well under an IMF program.
A prominent unsuccessful case of IMF intervention was the eﬀort to rescue Argentina from a
ﬁnancial collapse in 2001. The Argentine case has captured the popular imagination and led to a
rallying cry against the IMF in Latin America, but it was not always so; in the early 1990s Ar-
gentina was a showcase example of the beneﬁts of IMF-led macroeconomic stabilization. Argentina
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had suﬀered hyperinﬂation under Raul Alfonsin that reached 5,000 percent per year in 1989, and
president Carlos Menem came to oﬃce prepared to take dramatic action to stabilize the economy
and return to growth. After several false starts, in 1991 he appointed the former central banker
Domingo Cavallo as his minister of ﬁnance with the assignment of taming inﬂation. Cavallo turned
to the IMF for support, introduced the Convertibility Law, which ﬁxed the peso at parity to the
U.S. dollar, and ushered in a sweeping program of privatization. In 1991 our model estimates a
probability of 0.67 that Argentina would apply for an IMF program and an expected growth ben-
eﬁt of 4.3 percent of GDP. The results were indeed positive: inﬂation was rapidly brought under
control, foreign investment surged, and real GDP grew 10 percent in 1992, 6 percent in 1993, and 6
percent in 1994. A currency peg requires ﬁscal discipline to be sustainable, and in 1992 the Argen-
tine budget was almost balanced; in 1993 it ran a small surplus. The government’s commitment to
austerity ﬂagged as the economy recovered, however, and by 1995 the Argentine budget had moved
into persistent deﬁcit, which averaged over 3 percent of GDP for the rest of the decade. Debt rose
from 29 percent of GDP in 1992 to 50 percent by 2000, and the cost of servicing the debt reached
9.9 percent of national income. Inﬂation caused a steady appreciation of the real exchange rate and
a deterioration in the current account; in combination with mounting public debt, this made an
eventual devaluation of the peso inevitable. However, President Fernando de la Rua, who succeeded
Menem in 1999, was committed to retaining the ﬁxed parity of the peso, which obliged him to seek
further assistance from the IMF. As Figure 7 demonstrates, Argentina’s demand for IMF support
steadily rose throughout the 1990s and peaked at a 90 percent estimated probability of applying in
2001, while the estimated beneﬁts of program participation steadily declined. Argentina received
its largest IMF loan commitment of 17 billion SDRs in a program approved in 2000 and augmented
at Argentina’s request in 2001, but the accumulated debt had become so substantial that capital
markets were not reassured, and in January 2002 the country faced a combined currency, banking
and sovereign debt crisis. Riots forced the resignation of two presidents, and the economy moved
into a deep recession.
[Figure 7 about here]
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Table 4 provides a number of quantitative examples from our data to illustrate the relationship
between the predicted probability of government consent to participation in a program and growth
outcomes. The expected growth eﬀect is positive in cases in which the predicted probability of
participation is moderate or low, and is negative in cases with high predicted probabilities. More-
over, these patterns track the actual growth outcomes with only a few exceptions. In cases where
programs were initiated to stem the tide of ﬁnancial crashes, as in Mexico in 1995 and Indone-
sia in 1998, the government was eager to participate because other policy alternatives had been
exhausted. In each case, the predicted program eﬀect is to depress growth, although the actual
growth outcome is considerably worse than the eﬀect that our model attributes to participation
in an IMF program. Our model estimates that about one-third of the GDP decline in Mexico in
1995 and one-half of the decline in Indonesia in 1998 were due to their respective IMF programs.
Political instability played an important role in both countries, and that is not captured in our
model.
While these cases illustrate our ﬁnding that the eﬀects of initiating IMF programs depend upon
political context and the nature of the crises that compel countries to turn to the Fund for support,
a separate question is how the eﬀects of IMF programs vary between short-term and long-term
participants. IMF ﬁnancing was originally intended to address short-term balance-of-payments
problems, but many countries draw repeatedly on IMF funds for many years, and it has been
argued that long-term use of IMF resources is responsible for their poor track record. To the
contrary, however, it could be the case that IMF programs exercise more positive eﬀects over time
because IMF Staﬀ gradually ﬁne-tune their policy prescriptions as they gain experience in-country,
or because stabilization involves a trade-oﬀ of short-term adjustment for long-term performance,
and structural reforms take time to bear fruit. In order to investigate the dynamics of how IMF
programs aﬀect growth rates over time, we estimate a quadratic regression of the estimated growth
beneﬁt on the duration of program participation. The resulting plot is presented in Figure 6. The
ﬁgure shows that the average expected program eﬀect is signiﬁcant and positive throughout, but
steadily rises as the length of time a country has been under a program increases. This contradicts
arguments about the harmful eﬀects of recidivism, indicating that IMF programs have their most
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positive eﬀects on growth after a country has already participated in programs for several years. The
results are consistent with the interpretation that the increased beneﬁts of participation come from
a deepening of IMF Staﬀ’s understanding of local conditions, which ameliorates adverse selection
problems.
[Figure 6 about here.]
These results do not mean that long-term users of IMF ﬁnancing are fortunate countries with
admirable growth trajectories. Quite to the contrary, the majority of long-term users are poor
countries that suﬀer from economic mismanagement and political instability, and the fact that
they return frequently to the IMF for support reﬂects these conditions. As we demonstrated above,
the conditions that make these countries desperate for IMF support make them poor candidates to
perform well. However, the adverse selection into the set of long-term users should not be confused
with the treatment eﬀect of long-term participation in IMF programs. Our results indicate that the
average long-term user of IMF credit would have had economic performance that was considerably
worse in the absence of IMF support. When we control for selection into programs and model the
treatment eﬀect as potentially variable, we ﬁnd that the beneﬁts of IMF programs are actually
greater for countries that have participated for a number of years than for short-term participants.
Intuitively, our results mean that countries that are under extreme stress require several years to
receive the full beneﬁts of participation in an IMF program. Furthermore, conditional on having
been under a series of IMF programs, and being the kind of country that was likely to be under
a series of programs in the ﬁrst place, economic growth is likely to suﬀer more from exiting an
IMF program than from continuing. The policy implications of our analysis of adverse selection
are opposite those of the familiar moral hazard analysis. Rather than urging the IMF to curtail
long-term engagement with developing countries, our analysis suggests that IMF Staﬀ were in fact
correct to believe that long-term engagement was beneﬁcial.
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4 Conclusions
We argue that IMF programs appear to prevent rather than promote short-term economic growth
because they suﬀer from adverse selection. The countries that oﬀer the best prospects of successfully
implementing IMF programs are least likely to apply. When the selection process is modeled in
a way that explicitly allows for the possibility of adverse selection, the results demonstrate that
IMF programs generally have beneﬁcial consequences for short-term economic performance. This
contradicts the received wisdom of the ﬁeld, but is really unsurprising. IMF lending is intended
to prevent ﬁnancial, currency, or sovereign debt crises, which sharply reduce economic output
when they occur. Furthermore, if programs did not have expected beneﬁts, it is hard to explain
why governments voluntarily participate in them. The results are statistically signiﬁcant and
substantively important, and indicate that IMF programs are less contractionary on average than
the counterfactual in which they did not occur.
Our results, furthermore, have implications for an on-going debate within the Fund and outside
about the policy implications of long-term use of IMF resources. Countries that use IMF resources
are more likely to use them repeatedly, and the countries that do so include some of the poorest
and worst-managed economies in the world. Using the standard logic of moral hazard, scholars
and policy analysts have concluded that long-term use of Fund resources is detrimental to the
development of these countries, and have encouraged the Fund to limit itself to its original purpose of
providing short-term balance of payments assistance rather than long-term development assistance.
The logic of adverse selection suggests the opposite analysis: repeat users of IMF programs would
have had poor economic performance without programs as well, but the opportunity to interact
with them repeatedly allows the Fund to overcome its information disadvantage and screen out the
governments that are not making good-faith eﬀorts to promote reform. Consequently, long-term
users of Fund resources should beneﬁt more on average from program participation than short-term
users. Our empirical results demonstrate that this is, in fact, the case.
Our analysis suggests ways of mitigating the adverse selection problem, which should improve
the eﬀectiveness of IMF programs over time. Each of these mechanisms relies upon eﬀorts to
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separate worthy from unworthy borrowers. First, in order to mitigate adverse selection, it is
essential that the credibility of Fund enforcement of conditionality increase. If conditionality is
weakly enforced, it provides no incentives for governments that are not committed to reform to
declare themselves by refusing to participate in IMF programs. Second, the Fund should mitigate
the incentive for reform-averse governments to sign programs by front-loading conditionality in the
form of prior conditions and back-loading the phasing of loan disbursements. Third, the Fund
should increase the incentive for well-governed countries to participate in programs by raising the
value of a Fund program as a signal to the market. This requires the IMF to be more selective in
approving programs. A program cannot be a seal of approval if it is available to any member that
wants one; and if it conveys no positive information to the market, it is likely to convey negative
information.
Contrary to a substantial literature that has grown up to criticize the IMF, our analysis ﬁnds
evidence that IMF programs have improved the economic performance of the majority of the
countries that have participated in them. Furthermore, our ﬁndings indicate that it is possible
to estimate which countries have beneﬁtted and which have had their development stunted under
IMF programs. In our analysis – as in the process of IMF program design and evaluation – the key
factors that lead to success and failure are largely unobservable, and we can estimate them only
because they have observable implications for which countries choose to apply for IMF assistance.
If they were fully observable, adverse selection would be unproblematic. This indicates a fourth
strategy for improving IMF program outcomes, which is to study the political factors that lead to
program success and failure in order to reduce the degree of information asymmetry between the
Fund and its members.
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Figure 1: Strategic Selection into an IMF Program
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Figure 2: The Eﬀect of Reserves, Balance of Payments, Debt Service and Budget Balance on the
Government’s Choice Probability
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Figure 3: Estimated Growth Beneﬁt for Countries in the Sample
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Figure 4: Quadratic Fit of Estimated Growth Beneﬁt versus Government’s Probability
34
.6
.8
1
1.
2
1.
4
E
ffe
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
E
st
im
at
ed
 G
ro
w
th
 B
en
ef
it
-2 -1 0 1 2
St. Dev Change from the Mean
Reserves Budget Bal.
Debt Service Investment
Figure 5: The Eﬀect of Reserves, Debt Service, Investment and Budget Balance on the Estimated
Growth Beneﬁt of a Program Country
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Figure 6: The estimated Eﬀect of Program Duration on Growth Rates
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Figure 7: Predicted Probability of Applying and Estimated Growth Beneﬁt for Argentina (1991-
2004)
37
Government
Years 1970-1990 Years 1970-2008
Variable Pooled Enter Remain Pooled Enter Remain
Reserves 2.183
(.396)
-1.945
(.076)
-.918
(.023)
-.059
(.000)
-.614
(.030)
.689
(.137)
Budget Bal. -11.294
(.004)
-3.179
(.000)
.106
(.383)
-.004
(.648)
-.186
(.103)
.020
(.765)
Debt Serv. 12.284
(.008)
6.048
(.000)
.364
(.085)
.055
(.000)
.196
(.070)
.851
(.031)
Investment -6.048
(.013)
-2.086
(.003)
.114
(.424)
-.021
(.000)
-.054
(.074)
.020
(.669)
Years Under .049
(.976)
-.540
(.428)
.092
(.623)
.049
(.000)
.234
(.076)
-.033
(.494)
Num. Under 1.064
(.337)
.396
(.280)
-.099
(.483)
.001
(.749)
-.002
(.933)
-.088
(.095)
Lagged Elec. 14.804
(.009)
5.630
(.000)
-.098
(.644)
-.051
(.589)
1.36
(.315)
-1.676
(.064)
Constant 1.337
(.860)
1.176
(.635)
4.229
(.000)
-3.473
(.408)
-.134
(.854)
32.78
(.035)
IMF
Years 1970-1990 Years 1970-2008
Variable Pooled Enter Remain Pooled Enter Remain
B. of Payments -1.710
(.012)
-12.444
(.000)
2.808
(.024)
-.031
(.047)
-.228
(.001)
-.063
(.001)
Num. Under -.157
(.211)
-.268
(.007)
1.453
(.015)
.028
(.108)
-.009
(.128)
-.001
(.918)
Regime .388
(.037)
.368
(.096)
-.120
(.822)
-.366
(.083)
.114
(.483)
-.054
(.613)
Constant -.505
(.349)
.471
(.436)
.925
(.689)
.612
(.393)
.094
(.813)
1.144
(.000)
N of Observ. 1024 1024 1496 1496
Log-likelihood -344.65 -303.70 -896.66 -574.81
a. p-values for each coeﬃcient are reported in parentheses.
Table 1: Strategic selection into IMF Programs
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Lagged Growth 0.061 0.039
(0.054) (0.226)
Cap. Form. Gr 0.073 0.071 0.066
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Labor Force Gr. -0.522 -0.517 -0.483
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Inﬂation -0.118 -0.091 -0.096
(0.052) (0.134) (0.125)
λGOV -0.026 -0.025 -0.006
(0.037) (0.046) (0.667)
λIMF 0.107 0.104 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.970)
Constant 0.079 0.075 0.043
(0.124) (0.144) (0.409)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No No Yes
Average Growth Eﬀect 1.36 1.46 3.46
Expected % 58 60 77
Gross % 57 58 72
N 927 925 925
p-values in parentheses.
Table 2: Growth and IMF Programs using the Extended Data Set (1970-2008)
Est. Beneﬁt
Actual Gr. Neg. Pos. Total
Neg. 59 113 172
Pos. 57 284 341
Total 116 397 513
Table 3: Estimated Growth Beneﬁt and Actual Growth Rates for Countries Under a Program
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Country COW Year PrG(Apply) Est. Growth Actual
Country Code Beneﬁt Growth
Uruguay 165 2002 .961 -2.40 -14.49
Mexico 70 1995 .877 -2.95 -9.02
Pakistan 770 2001 .861 -2.77 -1.21
Uruguay 165 1998 .837 -.34 5.08
Philippines 840 1993 .826 -1.34 -.26
Indonesia 850 1998 .824 -7.60 -15.82
Gambia 420 1990 .798 -1.34 -1.45
Mali 432 2004 .746 -2.91 .77
Colombia 100 2002 .746 -.51 1.08
Brazil 140 1983 .716 -.52 -5.87
Guatemala 90 1990 .706 -1.32 .94
Jordan 663 1998 .520 2.21 -4.00
Uganda 500 1987 .495 7.25 .77
Mozambique 541 1988 .468 15.98 7.80
Macedonia 343 2005 .467 15.81 3.22
Dominican R. 42 1981 .434 .33 7.00
Nepal 790 2004 .369 9.35 1.68
Ethiopia 530 1993 .348 2.40 10.61
Thailand 800 1981 .283 .46 6.34
Albania 339 2003 .249 20.31 11.98
Cape Verde 402 2006 .236 5.86 8.63
Lesotho 570 1991 .216 2.76 -1.17
Table 4: Probability of Applying and Estimated Growth Beneﬁt
Actual Outcome
Pred. Outcome No Program Program Total
No Program 483 233 716
Program 256 524 780
Total 739 757 1496
Table 5: Predicted vs. Actual Program Cases
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Variable Description
Bal. of Payments Overall balance of payments in billions of US dollars (IFS)
Budget Bal. Central government overall surplus as a percentage of the GDP
Cap. Stock Gr. Growth of capital stock per capita
Debt Serv. Total debt service (% of GNP).
Growth The annual rate of growth of GDP
Investment Real gross domestic investment (private and public) as a
percentage of GDP
Labor Force Gr. Annual rate of growth of labor force
Lagged Elec. Dummy variable coded 1 if legislative elections were held
the previous country-year
Num. Under Total number of other countries in the world currently under
an IMF agreement (excluding the given country itself)
Regime Dummy variable coded 1 for dictatorships and 0
for democracies
Reserves International reserves to imports of goods and services
Under Dummy variable coded 1 for the country-years when there was
a conditioned IMF agreement
Years Under Cumulative number of years a country has been under IMF agreements
Table 6: Descriptions of the variables used in empirical analysis.
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Variable Observ. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Bal. of Payments 4957 .740 8.711 -141.308 204.143
Budget Bal. 3105 -2.171 6.225 -202.696 40.434
Cap. Stock Gr. 4823 6.049 37.675 -1923.492 723.202
Debt Serv. 3812 4.993 5.733 0 138.888
Growth 7434 .024 .074 -.652 1.222
Inﬂation 5717 3.739 51.648 -10 2441.103
Investment 7618 22.769 11.452 -33.141 111.290
Labor Force Gr. 4549 .023 .020 -.095 .246
Lagged Elec. 8292 .189 .391 0 1
Num. Under 11297 38.030 20.064 0 75
Regime 8612 .432 .495 0 1
Reserves 4706 3.575 3.318 -.092 43.693
Under 8447 .261 .439 0 1
Years Under 11297 4.235 7.307 0 41
Year 11297 1979 16.658 1950 2008
Table 7: Summary statistics of the variables used in empirical analysis.
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